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Vertical Organization, Technology Flows and R&D Incentives
An Exploratory Analysis
by Dietmar Harhoff*
Despite its importance, the impact of vertical organization on innovation incentives has
not been investigated in depth. This paper develops a number of testable hypotheses and
then provides a first exploratory empirical analysis, using cross-sectional industry-level
data. Two simple stylized facts emerge from the empirical results. First, once a frag-
mented buyer industry is dependent on a relatively concentrated supply sector, the
industry’s own R&D intensity is reduced substantially. Second, vertical technology flows
appear to act as substitutes for an industry's own R&D if the receiving industry's concen-
tration is relatively low. Both results are largely consistent with a number of case studies
and with theoretical arguments discussed in the paper.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Vertikale Organisation, Technologieflüsse und FuE-Anreize -
Eine explorative Studie
Der Einfluß der vertikalen Organisation von Industrien auf Innovationsanreize ist trotz
der Bedeutung der Fragestellung noch nicht detailliert untersucht worden. Dieses Papier
stellt eine Reihe von testbaren Hypothesen vor und präsentiert eine erste explorative
empirische Analyse auf der Basis eines Querschnittsdatensatzes. Zwei empirische Regu-
laritäten können nachgewiesen werden. Zum einen liegt die FuE-Intensität einer Industrie
erheblich unter dem üblichen Durchschnitt, wenn die Konzentration der Industrie niedrig
ist, aber eine Abhängigkeit von einer konzentrierten Zuliefererindustrie besteht. Zum
zweiten scheinen vertikale Technologieflüsse als Substitute für die eigene FuE einer
Industrie zu fungieren, sobald die Konzentration der Empfängerindustrie relativ niedrig
ist. Beide Resultate sind prinzipiell konsistent mit weiterer Evidenz aus Fallstudien und
mit den theoretisch hergeleiteten Hypothesen.
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This paper studies the relationship between the structure of supply sectors, vertical
technology flows and the R&D incentives of firms in downstream buyer industries. While
much of the work in the Schumpeterian tradition has focused on determinants of R&D
incentives within a given industry, little research has been produced on the effect of inter-
industry linkages, and of vertical organization in particular. The purpose of this paper is
to analyze whether the relationship between the structure of a supply industry and the
structure of a downstream industry has some bearing on downstream R&D incentives.
The main theoretical basis for presuming that such a relationship exists should not be
controversial. In any vertical channel of economic activities, rents are being generated
and shared horizontally between firms in a given industry. But the vertical rent
distribution between the participating industries may also have a bearing on R&D
incentives. Firms in any industry may behave strategically to increase the share of rents
accruing to their own industry. If these rents have to be shared with many competitors,
then naturally the respective incentive is weak. If one firm dominates an industry or has
obtained a monopoly position, then this incentive is comparatively strong.
Some of the modern insights of the innovation literature can be summarized by saying
that R&D incentives largely follow appropriability. Loosely speaking, the party that can
obtain the largest share of the rents from innovation is also likely to assume the burden of
the necessary investment. Applied to the question at hand, this leads to the hypothesis
that firms which dominate and profit most from a vertical channel of production activities
also make the investments that enhance the profits generated in this channel of activities.
By implication, this argument suggests that other firms tend to invest comparatively less.
Based on detailed argument how supplier firms can affect the vertical rent distribution in
their favor, this paper identifies cases of vertical organization in which these incentives
are particularly strong. If a supply sector is organized as a monopoly or a highly
concentrated oligopoly, and if the profitability of such producers depends highly on sales
to a particular downstream sector, then these firms are likely to contribute to
downstream productivity enhancement to increase their profits. In these cases, the locus
of innovation should shift to upstream sectors.
Moreover, this paper argues that the respective supplier firms may act strategically by
using disembodied knowledge to encourage entry or by distributing technical information
to maintain a competitive downstream industry structure. Finally, suppliers may attempt
to preempt major technical advances in downstream industries to prevent the emergence
of a more concentrated industry structure. Theory suggests that all of these strategies
have a relatively high payoff to the supply sector firms, if the ex ante structure of the
downstream sector is close to the competitive ideal. Finally, if such situations arise,
suppliers may also have strong incentives to structure tangible flows of technology (i.e.2
know-how that is embodied in their products) such that they act as substitutes for
downstream R&D.
The regression results described here strongly support the view that supply sector
organization has a significant role in shaping downstream R&D incentives. I find that
fragmented buyer industries which receive relatively large cost shares of their inputs from
concentrated supply sectors have a significantly lower R&D intensity than sectors relying
on more competitive supply structures. Furthermore, relatively concentrated downstream
sectors are not subject to this effect. The regression results are also consistent with the
hypothesis that firms in fragmented industries use the inflow of technology from
suppliers as a substitute for their own R&D, but this effect is weakened and eventually
reversed as the concentration of the downstream industry increases.
The remainder of this paper is structured into four sections. In Section 2, I briefly
summarize the existing literature on interindustry technology flows, in particular the
contributions by Scherer (1982), Pavitt (1984) and Farber (1981). Testable hypotheses
based on the literature and on my own theoretical work are developed in Section 3.
Section 4 employs a simple linear specification for a regression analysis of R&D
intensity, using industry-level data from the Federal Trade Commission which is matched
with qualitative data from the Yale Survey. Implications and limitations of this research
are discussed in Section 5.
2 Vertical Organization, Interindustry Technology Flows, and R&D Incentives
2.1 A Review of the Empirical Literature
Interindustry technology flows and the vertical organization of production activities have
not played a major role in recent theoretical and empirical work on innovation and
technological change. This fact is quite surprising, given that institutionally oriented
researchers (Pavitt 1984; von Hippel 1988) have produced persuasive evidence that the
composition of supply sectors is often correlated with distinct innovation patterns within
a given industry. Structural changes in the American economy have also been linked to
changes in input and output flows in Carter's (1970) extensive analysis. In recent
econometric studies, Levin and Reiss (1988), and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have
included in their models variables that account for the contributions to innovation made
by external sources of technology, e.g. equipment and materials suppliers. But all of
these studies have treated the contributions originating in other sectors as exogenously
given. The interdependence between R&D incentives of firms in different industries is
not yet fully understood.3
The importance of R&D performed by other sectors for an industry's productivity
growth was demonstrated as early as 1967 in research by Brown and Conrad (1967).
Regression studies by Raines (1971) and Terleckyj (1974) confirmed the Brown-Conrad
result, but they also produced some unexpected estimates. Raines and Terleckyj found
that R&D embodied in intermediate and capital goods was a statistically significant
determinant of an industry's productivity, but that the industry's own R&D was no longer
significant once the measure of embodied R&D was included.1 However, the measures
for embodied R&D used in these early studies do not inspire great confidence. R&D
expenditures of a supplier industry are simply distributed according to the distribution of
purchases by downstream industries. The true allocation of upstream R&D resources
probably differs from the one implicitly assumed in these studies.
Two extensive empirical studies (Pavitt 1984; Scherer 1982) have provided us with a
more precise and detailed description of interindustry technology flows. Scherer (1982)
conducted a major effort to map the technology flows between industries in the United
States economy and produced a detailed technology flow matrix. The idea of such a
matrix dates back to Schmookler (1966), who used patent data to calculate measures for
the rate of production and consumption of novel technologies in several industries.
Scherer's efforts were similar, but produced data at a far greater level of detail. Using
443 large US corporations reporting under the FTC line of business survey as his sample,
Scherer and associates analyzed the specifications of all 15,112 patents that were
obtained by these firms in the period between June 1976 and March 1977. Among other
information, patent specifications include data regarding the prospective use of the
patented technology. The value of the patent was approximated as the average (per
patent) R&D expense incurred by the inventor. The flow variable constructed by Scherer
measures then the innovator's R&D expenditures flowing to the sector using the new
technology. Each industry is conceivably a user of technology produced by other
industries and conversely produces technology for use by other sectors. The technology
flow matrix captures these flows in a simple way.
Patents are used in this data construction effort to allocate an industry's R&D
expenditures to a sector of use.2 The measure of total R&D use can be calculated under
                                               
1  A more detailed discussion of these issues is given by Nelson and Winter (1977). Nelson
and Winter provide several explanations for this counterintuitive result, but all of their
arguments are based on the assumption that some variables are measured with error. The
theoretical model developed by Harhoff (1996) seems to imply another explanation: an
industry's productivity and the R&D content of inputs may be determined endogenously.
The coefficient on the variables measuring the R&D content of inputs will then be
biased.
2  Industry- and technology-based idiosyncrasies in patenting behavior will therefore not
necessarily create a bias as long as the overall distribution of patents across sectors of
use is not affected. But there are other measurement issues. Scherer (1984) describes
some of the problems that had to be solved in order to allocate R&D meaningfully to
using sectors. Other aspects of this dataset are discussed in detail by Scherer (1984) and4
two alternative assumptions. If the R&D results produced in one sector and transferred
to several other industries have public goods characteristics (public goods assumption),
then all recipients are credited with the origin industry's R&D expenditures weighted by a
correction factor that reflects differences in the purchasing volume of the product
embodying the R&D knowledge. Under the private good assumption, the R&D flows
received by the using industries add up to the origin industry's R&D expenditures.
Scherer calculated both data series for over two hundred industries.
A particularly difficult problem is the allocation of R&D to own process improvements.
It is reasonable to assume that process innovations are often not patented and instead
protected by secrecy. This would lead to a downward bias in the ratio of patents
indicating internal use of R&D resources. But comparing his estimates to those of two
alternative data sources (McGraw Hill research and development expenditure surveys
and the PIMS data base of the Strategic Planning Institute), Scherer finds no evidence
that the process R&D share measures are seriously biased.
Scherer's results suggest that there is considerable variation in the ratio of R&D
produced to R&D consumed. Sectors like lumber and wood products, ferrous metals,
textiles, and apparel and leather are characterized by low origin to use ratios. Conversely,
industries like farm machinery, computers and office equipment, construction and mining
machinery, or instruments produce several times as much R&D than they consume.
Results very similar to these are provided by Pavitt (1984), who uses data on about 2000
significant innovations introduced in the British industry between 1945 and 1979 to
analyze sectoral patterns of innovation. For each innovation, he identifies the sector in
which the innovation originated, the sector of final use, and the sector of the firm's
principal activity. As in Scherer's work, the interindustry technology flows can be
identified, though their measurement is now based on the number of significant
innovations rather than expenditure-weighted patent counts. Based on his data, Pavitt
proposes a taxonomy of three distinct patterns of innovation: supplier dominated
innovation, innovation that largely depends on large-scale production, and science-based
innovation.
Pavitt suggests that innovation in industries like agriculture, construction, textiles,
lumber, wood and paper mill products, and printing and publishing originates mainly with
suppliers of equipment and materials. Firms in the respective sector make only minor
contributions to their own product and process technology. According to Pavitt, these
                                                                                                                                         
in a comment by Mansfield. For example, it is well-known that patents can be of
different value and importance. This view has been confirmed in a number of studies
using patent renewal data, e.g. Pakes (1986). A recent study of German patents comes to
the conclusion that patent renewal studies may even underestimate the skewness of the
patent value distribution (Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel 1998).5
firms tend to be small and have only limited internal R&D capabilities. Conversely,
production-intensive firms operate on the basis of large-scale technologies that allow for
considerable economies of scale. But these economies are latent, i.e., they do not emerge
automatically, but are achieved at the cost of internal efforts which are often undertaken
by specialized production engineering departments.3 Innovation in scale-intensive sectors
may also originate with relatively small and highly specialized input suppliers (e.g. for
instrumentation or process equipment). Finally, Pavitt identifies science-based sectors in
which firms rely heavily on their own R&D efforts which are closely linked to progress in
underlying sciences like chemistry, biology, or physics (among others). A recent example
of such a sector is the emerging biotechnology industry in which several new enterprises
were founded by university researchers.
The contributions by Scherer and Pavitt are noteworthy for several reasons. Both use
samples from different countries and different underlying measures for innovative output.
Nonetheless, a number of patterns detected in their data are emarkably similar. Both
studies provide some support for the notion that R&D results are embodied in an
industry's output and that buyers can often enjoy considerable benefit spillovers due to
imperfect appropriability by firms in the producer industry. Furthermore, the sectors
identified as net users or net producers of innovative technology match each other
closely.4 But it is also clear that the precise measurement of these effects is a difficult
matter.
 Furthermore, the determinants of the interindustry technology flows described by
Scherer and Pavitt are still poorly understood. For many practical purposes, the
descriptive account of technology flows proves immensely helpful and sufficient. But it is
of great theoretical interest to probe deeper and explore the endogenous determination
of these flows. One way to approach this question is to explore the interdependence
between R&D incentives of firms in vertically related industries. This is done in the next
section.
Farber's (1981) study is to my knowledge the only empirical effort to shed some light on
this question.5 Farber analyzes the effect of buyer market structure on the R&D
incentives of seller industries and considers several effects of buyer market structure on
the seller's rent expectations, e.g. the magnitude of rents, their appropriability, and the
speed of adoption of technologies in the buyer industry. Using a model originally
developed by Demsetz (1969), Farber suggests that the magnitude of innovation rents is
greater if the buyer market is more monopolistic. With respect to appropriability and
                                               
3  A detailed discussion of such efforts is given by Levin (1977) and Rosenberg (1976).
The term latent economies of scale originates with Levin.
4  A comparison between these results is provided in Pavitt (1983).
5  Some theoretical work preceding Farber's study can be found in Binswanger and Ruttan
(1978) who discuss a supplier's incentives to create a bias in the direction of
technological change.6
speed of adoption, he argues that increased concentration on the buyer's side is likely to
discourage seller R&D efforts, in particular if the seller market itself is competitive.
Farber's main argument is based on the notion that price discrimination is facilitated in
settings where few sellers face many buyers. Farber then estimates a simultaneous
equations system for R&D intensity (measured as employment of engineers and scientists
divided by total employment), advertising intensity, and seller market concentration.
Buyer market concentration is measured as the sales-weighted average of the four-firm
concentration ratios of the industries the seller industry is supplying to. Farber's
estimation results indicate that both buyer and seller market concentration have a strong
and significant negative effect on the seller industry's R&D efforts. The interaction
between these two variables, however, is positive and highly significant. Taken together,
these results indicate that the sellers' R&D activity increases with buyer market
concentration when the seller market itself is concentrated, but that it decreases with
buyer concentration when the seller market is fragmented.
In the following section, I summarize the existing and new theoretical arguments that
would lead us to conjecture that vertical organization (a particular combination of
supplier and buyer market structures) and technology flows would have a bearing on
R&D incentives. To focus on the case that will be considered in the empirical part of the
paper, I am concentrating on the impact of supplier industry structure and behavior on
R&D incentives of a downstream buyer industry.
2.2 A Summary of Theoretical Arguments
HOLD-UP PROBLEMS
Williamson (1975, p. 204) discusses how R&D incentives are affected by hold-up
problems, i.e., by dynamic inconsistency and the lack of appropriate commitment
mechanisms. Williamson describes conditions under which the burden of conducting
R&D may be shifted from small suppliers to large established buyers in the vertical chain,
but the logic of his argument can easily be applied to the interaction between large sellers
and small buyers. Market thinness (high concentration) and barriers to entry in the buyer
industry (e.g. created by first-mover advantages), according to Williamson, limits the
rents that an upstream innovator can obtain from selling its technology to downstream
firms. Innovation may have the character of a relationship-specific investment, inviting
the downstream firm to behave opportunistically ex post. The lack of innovation
incentives may then lead to a shift of R&D efforts in the vertical chain. Williamson's
comments are explicitly based on the notion that the same R&D projects can be
alternatively undertaken by either the supplier or the buyer. In his work, the incentive
shift arises from the large firm's problem to commit itself to pay a reasonable price for
the innovation. Note that in this case, the party which could behave opportunistically ex7
post will have to undertake innovation because it was not able to commit itself.
Williamson implicitly suggests that it would be to the advantage of the downstream firms
to commit itself. In that case, no incentive shift would occur in his model.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
As discussed above, Farber (1981) has suggested that oligopolistic suppliers have
comparatively greater power of price discrimination if they face a fragmented buyer
industry. He concludes that price discrimination should allow innovators in the supply
sector to reap greater quasi-rents for their innovations, and thus promote upstream R&D
incentives. Farber's argument is essentially an application of the countervailing power
hypothesis to R&D incentives.6 Since greater appropriability via price discrimination
affects R&D expenditures in a positive way, Farber tests his suggestion using upstream
R&D intensity as the dependent variable, and finds the expected result confirmed in a
cross-sectional regression study.
Farber does not comment on the effect that upstream price discrimination might have on
innovative activity in downstream sectors. Whether such an effect should exist or not
depends on how price discrimination is implemented in particular pricing strategies.
Ideally, the upstream producers would like to leave downstream incentives for R&D
intact, since downstream R&D may impose a positive externality on the upstream
sector.7 Extraction of quasi-rents then has no effect on R&D expenditures, sales, and the
ratio of these two, R&D intensity.
But even if downstream R&D incentives are distorted, this effect in all likelihood is not
visible in the downstream industry's R&D intensity. If upstream suppliers can
discriminate and ask some buyer for higher prices than they would be paying under a
linear pricing schedule, production costs will be higher for these firms. Theoretical
models suggest that a higher level of downstream production costs reduces downstream
R&D incentives.8 However, higher input prices will also depress sales, so that R&D
intensity (defined as R&D expenditures over sales) does not necessarily change or only
through a second-order effect with ambiguous direction.9 This is of course one of the
                                               
6  This hypothesis originated with Galbraith (1952).
7  This is the classical vertical restraint problem. Under ideal circumstances, the upstream
producer would want to appropriate the full downstream surplus and not affect
downstream incentives for cost reduction in a negative way.
8  For example, the Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980) model predicts that R&D expenditures will
decrease with higher cost. The Dorfman-Steiner model makes a similar prediction.
However, high input costs may induce R&D with the purpose of substitution in which
case this relationship may no longer hold.
9  For example, in the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model or in Tandon's (1984) model of R&D,
factor prices do not affect the industry's R&D intensity. Note that this statement will not8
virtues of this measure, and a reason why it has been so popular in empirical analyses.
Upstream price discrimination per se is therefore unlikely to affect downstream R&D
intensity. This result does not imply that there cannot be a socially detrimental
disincentive effect. Clearly, both downstream industry output and R&D expenditures
may be reduced in the presence of effective price discrimination by suppliers. Upstream
appropriability may actually be too strong even from the supplier firms' point of view.
The optimal pricing policy of a supplier may require a credible commitment to charge a
relatively low price in the future. If suppliers do not have the capability to restrict their
own future behavior in a credible way, downstream producers may reduce their R&D
efforts. As a consequence then, the supply sector may have to engage in R&D efforts
that compensate for the lessened downstream incentives. This is in essence an extension
of Williamson's (1975) argument. Excessive appropriability and commitment problems
can shift R&D activities from the downstream to the upstream sector. Furthermore, if
upstream R&D then enhances downstream output (even without reducing downstream
R&D expenditures), downstream R&D intensity is lowered.
STRATEGIC SUPPLIER R&D
Vertical organization may also have an impact on R&D incentives even in the absence of
hold-up and price discrimination effects. In particular, even if the market for disembodied
information fails to work properly (as is widely alleged in the innovation literature),
supplier firms may profit under certain circumstances from strategically generating
information spillovers. In all likelihood, these would not be captured in the technology
flow data described above since the latter focus on R&D embodied in products. In the
following paragraphs I briefly summarize the theoretical arguments which support this
view. A formal model is presented in Harhoff (1996) where I also discuss a number of
case studies that have lent considerable support to the hypothesis of strategic supplier
R&D.
In intermediate goods markets, oligopolistic suppliers may care more about the overall
size of their market than would competitive suppliers under otherwise comparable
circumstances. Enlarging the market size can yield quasi-rents even if prices for the
suppliers' products cannot be raised, or if upstream competitors have relatively stable
market shares. To focus on these incentives, let me assume in the following discussion
that the pre- and post-innovation prices for the factor supplied by the upstream sector are
indeed identical.
                                                                                                                                         
hold if innovation is factor-biased or if the cost curve is not isoelastic in R&D. However,
the effect on R&D intensity will still be of second order.9
Upstream producers may then decide to engage in activities that stimulate factor demand
or prevent a restriction of demand growth. This may happen in at least three different
and conceptually distinct ways.
First, suppliers may seek to induce entry into their buyer industries (entry effect). The
desirability of the entry effect is contingent on the implications of entry for downstream
R&D incentives and factor demand. This strategy may be profitable for suppliers even if
downstream R&D incentives are reduced, since firms in the upstream sector may value
downstream competition more than downstream innovation. Entry accomodation can
occur if the supplier undertakes R&D and offers new entrants the results of its efforts as
a costless service. Downstream firms will see a reduction in their own R&D incentives
unless they have some form of comparative advantage in R&D.
Second, upstream producers may seek to lower downstream costs or enhance
downstream product quality if their customers are not sufficiently engaged in these
activities (productivity effect). This effect may occur even if the number of downstream
firms is fixed and cannot be influenced. Assume for example that the nature of
downstream R&D is such that there are no strong appropriation mechanisms. This would
be the case if innovations can be copied easily and quickly by other buyer firms, and if
patent protection is weak. In this case, suppliers may have to promote the downstream
innovation process to enlarge their markets. This may again occur by giving downstream
firms access to the results of their own R&D.
The third effect (preemption effect) may induce upstream firms to preempt downstream
R&D activities to maintain a largely competitive structure in the downstream market. If
the supplier firm develops a technology and maintains control over it, then downstream
buyers cannot build dominant market positions that are based on technological
superiority. Suppose for example that patent protection in the downstream sector is
relatively strong. Then supplier firms would want to avoid the emergence of a patent-
based monopoly in that industry and the concomitant problem of double marginalization.
A simple way to avoid this problem is to obtain the patent by preemption and to give any
interested downstream firm access to the technology.
These three incentives arise only if the welfare of firms in the upstream sector is strongly
tied to the extent of competition and innovation in the downstream sector, i.e., if the cost
share of upstream producers in downstream production is high and if suppliers can
demand a factor price above marginal cost. Since strategically induced changes in the
downstream industry may represent a public good for the upstream sector as a whole,
these strategic incentives are also likely to vary with the market share that upstream firms
hold.
The suppliers' incentives for making strategic R&D investments are also contingent on
conditions in the downstream sector. In the case of the entry effect, existing barriers to10
entry and sunk cost investments in the downstream industry are likely to reduce upstream
incentives to engage in accommodation of new entrants.10
A similar argument holds in the case of the productivity effect. The incentives to induce
higher productivity in downstream firms are illustrated in Figure 1. Assume that an
upstream supplier can transfer a cost-reducing innovation to downstream firms. Suppose
that this innovation cannot be sold profitably in a market, since it essentially consists of
disembodied knowledge. This is not an implausible assumption at all - many observers
have noted that the market for knowledge is highly imperfect. Furthermore, let the
upstream firm's profit be an increasing function of downstream output as one could










Figure 1: Output Effect of a Cost-Reducing Innovation
The innovation reduces downstream costs from the ex ante level c to the ex post level c'
so that Dc = c - c'. Consider first the case of a downstream monopoly or of a dominant
firm.11 The downstream monopolist will be able to restrict ex post output and the cost
reduction will translate into a relatively small increase in output DQM. Conversely, in the
case of a perfectly competitive downstream industry that adopts the supplier's
technology, there will be no restriction on ex post industry output and the supplier enjoys
the greatest possible increase in factor demand, denoted DQC  in Figure 1. Upstream
incentives to induce a cost reduction effect are then the stronger, the closer the
downstream industry approaches the competitive ideal. In this case, the supplier can shift
out the demand curve for his commodity by the maximum possible extent.
                                               
10  The formal argument is stated in Harhoff (1996). Once sunk costs other than those of
R&D determine industry structure, the effect of upstream spillover production on
downstream industry structure will be smaller, ceteris paribus.
11  By output restriction I mean the difference in downstream industry output between i) a
perfectly competitive industry in which all firms produce with the low-cost technology
and ii) an oligopolistic or monopolistic downstream industry where firms produce less
than the competitive output in order to extract rents.11
A similar argument can be made in the case of upstream preemption incentives.
Preempting downstream innovation is less profitable for suppliers if ex post the
downstream industry can still be structured as a tight oligopoly. The reason is again that
oligopolists restrict output to assure themselves a price exceeding marginal cost.
Thus, all three mechanisms promise greater marginal returns to suppliers, if the upstream
industry is concentrated and the downstream sector is fragmented. This is the type of
vertical organization where we are likely to observe a reduction in downstream R&D
incentives.12
2.3 Hypotheses
This section summarizes the above arguments in the form of hypotheses that will guide
the empirical analysis. First, we expect that certain types of vertical organization, in
particular the combination of a fragmented downstream market with a concentrated
supply sector, may lead to a shift of the locus of R&D to the upstream industry, at least
with respect to the production of disembodied information. As I have argued above, this
should lead to a reduction in the downstream industry's R&D incentives. Thus, we have
Hypothesis 1
The research intensity of a fragmented buyer industry is negatively correlated
with the industry's dependence on concentrated supply sectors.
Of course, this hypothesis can also be supported by the arguments put forth by
Williamson (1975) and Farber (1981). A strict separation of these hypotheses is not
possible. However, Williamson's work suggests that a shift in the locus of R&D also
leads to substitution effects with respect to embodied technology flows. Thus, the
following hypothesis on the impact of technology flows states
Hypothesis 2
Technology flows into a fragmented buyer industry are negatively correlated with
the industry's R&D intensity.
                                               
12  Note that the spillover studies by Bernstein (1988, 1989) and Bernstein and Nadiri
(1988, 1989) also show that vertical spillovers lead to a reduction of the recipient
industry's R&D expenditures. However, these authors assume that the impact of
disembodied information flows is an unintended one. Contrary to this position, the
arguments provided here state that suppliers may use spillovers strategically if vertical
organization assumes a particular form.12
Moreover, these flows should be particularly strong if a fragmented buyer industry faces
a concentrated supply sector. Whether the technology flow variables and the structural
variables measuring supply sector organization do indeed measure the same or a similar
phenomenon should be visible in their performance in a regression analysis. The inclusion
of the technology flow variable should weaken the coefficient of the structural measures
if such an overlap exists, but it should leave the coefficient unaffected (or strengthen it) if
the two variables capture different phenomena.
Note that the hypotheses have not been formulated as causal statements, since a cross-
sectional test cannot demonstrate any causal direction. Therefore, statistical support for
these hypotheses may be interpreted in various ways. However, since our knowledge of
the relationship between vertical organization and R&D incentives is still poor, even
these partial correlations should prove instructive.
3 Data Sources and Specification
3.1 Data Sources
The data used here are taken from the 1976 FTC Line of Business Database and from the
1977 input-output tables of the US economy. The technology flow variables are based
on Scherer's (1984) study. The patent data were also compiled by Scherer, and a
description of these data is given in Scherer (1983). I also make use of survey data which
are often referred to as the Yale survey and described in Levin et al. (1987). To identify
these survey variables in the subsequent discussion, I will use the superscript character
'Y', for Yale survey. A summary of variables and data sources is provided in the
Appendix (Table A.1). Sample statistics of the dependent and independent variables are
summarized in the Appendix (Table A.2).
Combining data from several sources in a test of this form is not without problems.
While the Yale survey was designed to be used in conjunction with the FTC data, I had
to match the input-output (SIC classifications) to the corresponding FTC data. Such a
matching procedure is common practice in cross-sectional analyses of R&D intensity, but
it may nonetheless introduce an errors-in-variables problem.
3.2 Empirical Specification
While structural models are in principle preferable to reduced-form equations (see
Harhoff 1997), they may also impose undue constraints on the estimation results (Cohen
and Levin 1989, p. 1085). Since this research is largely exploratory, I model an industry's
R&D intensity (denoted RS below) as a linear function of dependent variables. Only13
company-financed R&D is included in the R&D variable, since the incentives and
opportunities to perform government-funded R&D or other contracted R&D work pose
a problem in their own right.13
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), I approximate the right-hand side of the
regression equation as a linear function of independent variables. The independent
variables fall into four broad categories. A short summary is presented here, and exact
definitions are provided in the Appendix. The first three categories (demand,
appropriability, and technological opportunity) follow closely the variable definitions
used in a recent empirical investigation by Cohen and Levinthal (1989).14 However, the
present analysis is somewhat more limited in degrees of freedom, since I only use the
FTC data aggregated by line of business, while Cohen and Levinthal employed the same
dataset at the firm level. The fourth group of explanatory variables captures the effect of
vertical organization on R&D intensity.
Demand conditions are controlled for by measures of price elasticity (PELAS), income
elasticity (INCELAS) and an industry growth rate (GROWTH). These measures were
calculated from the 1970 and 1977 input-output tables by Levin (1981). While industry
growth and income elasticity should affect research intensity positively, the sign of the
coefficient of price elasticity is ambiguous. An aggregate measure of appropriability
(APPR
Y) and imitation lag time for a product innovation (IMLAG
Y) are also included
among the independent variables. These measures are derived from the survey conducted
by Levin et al. (1987). I have to assume here that appropriability conditions have
remained fairly stable between 1976 and 1983. This assumption has been made implicitly
in a number of studies using the appropriability variables from the Yale survey in
conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission's 1976 R&D data (Cohen and Levinthal
1990; Levin and Reiss 1988).
It is also common practice in this literature to use measures of technological opportunity
to control for inter-industry differences. The measures are supposed to capture the
closeness of an industry to the sciences, the contributions of other sectors to technical
change in the industry, and the maturity of the industry. The Levin et al. (1987) survey
data have become the standard source for these variables, but due to the small sample
size of 120 lines of business I can only include a limited number of these. However, since
                                               
13  Again this raises the thorny issue of additional endogenous relationships. If
government-funded R&D has side effects (e.g. spillover effects from the government
funded to the privately funded projects) then private R&D incentives are affected by the
extent of contract R&D and vice versa. Levin and Reiss (1984) model government-
funded R&D in a simultaneous equations model together with company-financed R&D
and advertising. The inclusion of the contract R&D equation does not appear to have a
great empirical payoff. See also Lichtenberg (1987, 1988) for studies concerning the
effect of government-sponsored R&D on private incentives
14  Some of these measures have also been used by Levin et al. (1985).14
previous analyses are available I can aggregate variables, for example by relying on some
of the Cohen and Levinthal results.
Greater relevance of the sciences related to an industry's technological base may
necessitate the allocation of R&D resources that are not required in an industry, where
the underlying scientific and technical relationships are well-established and mature. The
existence of science-based knowledge may encourage the building of internal R&D
capabilities precisely to absorb and utilize the external knowledge, as Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) have suggested. External scientific knowledge may also affect the
marginal cost of R&D and thus lead to increased utilization of R&D resources. But the
effect of closeness to sciences is ambiguous ex ante. Besides having a positive effect on a
firm's R&D investment, a greater relevance of the scientific disciplines may also result in
new information that serves as a substitute for internally produced knowhow and can
thereby cause a reduction in R&D efforts. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) study the
relevance of eleven basic and applied scientific disciplines on R&D investments and find
that most of them are positively correlated with R&D intensity at the firm level. I define
as SCIENCE1
Y the average relevance of all disciplines that yielded a positive effect in
the Cohen/Levinthal study (i.e., biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, computer
science, materials science, and medical science). SCIENCE2
Y is defined as the average
relevance of disciplines with a significant negative effect (agricultural science, applied
mathematics and operations research, geology, and metallurgy) in the Cohen/Levinthal
study. This procedure is admittedly heuristic, but it offers the advantage of economizing
on degrees of freedom while maintaining relevant control variables.
Several external sectors may contribute to technical change in an industry. To control for
the effect that R&D embodied in capital equipment may have, I follow Cohen and
Levinthal and include in the regression analysis a measure of contributions by upstream
suppliers of production and research equipment (EQSUP
Y). As an indicator for
downstream contributions originating with users of an industry's output, I include the
variable USERS
Y. As von Hippel (1988) has pointed out, users of a product are in many
industries at least a source of innovative ideas, and often even the first to build
prototypes of innovative products.
Government agencies, laboratories, and universities may also affect an industry's R&D
intensity, since they constitute sources of external knowledge with either complementary
or substitute character. The variable used here - GOVUNIV - is the average of
GOVTECH
Y and UNIVTECH
Y as used by Cohen and Levinthal.15
                                               
15  These two measures were again derived from the 1983 questionnaire survey conducted
by Levin and associates. For details of variable definition see Table A.1 in the
Appendix.15
Finally, the age of an industry's capital stock may have a significant effect on the extent
of R&D efforts in comparison to industry sales (Levin et al. 1985). The FTC data include
a measure of an industry's percentage of property, plant, and equipment installed within
the five years preceding 1976. This measure (NEWPL10) is included in all of the
regressions presented below. Again, consistent with previous results, I expect a positive
effect, since the newness of production lines will be positively correlated with innovation
activities like debugging, debottlenecking, etc.
Testing the hypotheses developed above requires an operationalization of the supply
industry's characteristics. The supply sector variables used here only capture the possible
influence of intermediate goods producers (components, materials, etc.).16 A simple
measure of supply sector organization is the sum of cost shares of intermediate inputs
weighted by the respective supply sector's four-firm concentration ratio (WSH for
weighted factor shares).17 I computed this measure from the 1977 input-output tables
and census information on industry structure.18 Any intermediate inputs that were
produced by the industry itself (secondary production) were excluded from these
calculations. The reason for this exclusion is that vertical integration into the production
of these inputs would of course lower the dependence of the downstream industry on
upstream supplies.
The aggregate measure of supply sector organization (WSH) can be an ambiguous
characterization of a given industry, since very different supply sector structures can be
characterized by the same value of WSH. To circumvent this problem I also constructed
a second measure that groups supply sectors into two categories according to their four-
firm concentration ratio. Supply sector organization is characterized by the cost share of
intermediate inputs supplied by industries with a four-firm concentration ratio of greater
than forty-five per cent (SH45).19
                                               
16  The Levin et al. (1985) survey also measures the contributions of materials suppliers.
None of the regression results include this variable, since it had a very small and
insignificant coefficient in all specifications. The results also did not indicate any
tradeoff between the materials supplier and vertical organization variables.
17  The underlying assumption is here that upstream contributions can be additive.
18  These calculations are based on Miller and Blair (1985, ch. 5). Only the supply of
intermediate inputs is captured in the supply sector measures. Capital goods were
excluded, since it is virtually impossible to obtain reasonably precise measures of capital
goods flows from standard IO tables. The BEA data from which such variables could be
constructed were not available for this analysis. For details on the use of the BEA
capital goods flow data, see Scherer (1984, p. 430).
19  Initially, I classified upstream industries according to their four-firm concentration ratio
into intervals from 0 to 15, 15 to 30, 30 to 45, and 45 to 60, and greater than 60 per
cent. Since the inclusion of five variables (plus five interaction effects) would reduce the
degrees of freedom considerably, I aggregate the first three groups (supply industries
with a four-firm concentration ratio of less than 45 per cent) and the last two (supply16
Finally, I use technology flow measures based on Scherer's (1984) study in which he
linked R&D expenditures to patents and determined the industry in which the respective
technology was applied. From his data I computed a measure of the amount of R&D
flowing into an industry from external sources, defined as the difference between the
total R&D used by the industry (RDUSE) minus the amount of own R&D spent on
process innovations. This indicator is divided by the receiving industry's sales in order to
construct a measure analogous to the R&D intensity of the industry. Since Scherer
computed the matrix both under a public goods and a private goods assumption, I use
both technology flow measures (EXTERN1 for the public goods assumption, EXTERN2
in the case of the private goods assumption) to test the robustness of the empirical
results.
The regressions include the measures of supply sector organization and interaction terms
necessary to identify relevant subsamples in which a substitution effect between upstream
and downstream R&D is either likely or not likely to occur. Since these interaction terms
utilize the four-firm concentration ratio (which is presumably endogenously determined
with the dependent variable), they are conceivably correlated with the error terms of the
R&D regressions. To avoid simultaneity bias I re-estimate the R&D equation using
nonlinear instrumental variables (IV) estimators.
4 Estimation Results
The results of the regressions following the simple linear model are presented in Tables 1
and 2. Table 1 presents least squares results, while Table 2 compares the OLS estimate
for the full model to nonlinear 2SLS estimates.
The heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance estimator proposed by White (1980)
is used in all regressions, since Breusch-Pagan tests on the benchmark specification (R1)
indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity-corrected OLS results are
denoted by OLS-H, while the nonlinear instrumental variables estimators (also using the
White correction) are denoted 2SLS. The sample consists of 120 lines of business for
each specification.
Since both supply sector variables WSH10 and SH45 produced very similar results, I
present only estimates using the SH45 measure. Presumably due to the small sample size,
                                                                                                                                         
industries with a four-firm concentration ratio equal to or greater than 45 per cent
(SH45)). This cut-off point was chosen in order to minimize the effect of errors in
variables, since the variable values in the fifth category were small in most industries.
However, the regression results do not change qualitatively if, instead of SH45, the cost
share of intermediate goods supplied by industries with concentration greater than sixty
per cent is used.17
some coefficients have fairly large standard errors, but most results appear to be
consistent with those obtained by Cohen and Levinthal. The coefficients on price and
income elasticity (PELAS and INCELAS) are highly significant in the OLS specifications
and have the same sign as in the Cohen/Levinthal study. The coefficients for GROWTH
and APPR
Y are positive, but insignificant in all specifications. They are therefore not
reported in the two tables. This result is not completely unexpected for the
appropriability variable APPR
Y. Statistical shortcomings of this variable have been
discussed before and may be due to problems in the survey instrument used by Levin et
al.20 The imitation lag variable (IMLAG
Y) only becomes significant after the supply
sector and technology flow variables are included among the independent variables.
The point estimates for the two variables measuring the relevance of scientific disciplines
also carry the expected sign. Both SCIENCE1
Y and SCIENCE2
Y appear to have strong
effects on R&D intensity. But only the SCIENCE2
Y variable is significant throughout all
specifications, while the effect of SCIENCE1
Y is weakened once the supply sector and
technology flow variables are included. Nonetheless, the separation of the two science
variables according to prior regression results has a clear payoff here, since the control
for the effect of scientific disciplines is far better than with inclusion of only one
aggregate variable (not reported separately).
Greater contributions by equipment suppliers (EQSUP
Y) tend to reduce an industry's
R&D intensity. This phenomenon may occur for two reasons.
First, the industry's own R&D efforts may be significantly lower if equipment suppliers
offer capital goods that are substitutes for an industry's own R&D efforts.
Second, the contributions by equipment suppliers may simply enhance the productivity of
the downstream sector without affecting the buyer firms' R&D decisions, thus leading to
higher output at the same level of R&D expenditures. We would then expect to see a
reduction in the industry's R&D intensity.
Since the supply sector variables only capture the effect of intermediate input suppliers,
but not of capital goods suppliers, it is not surprising that the coefficient on EQSUP
Y
does not change dramatically once the variables measuring supply sector structure are
included. However, one should expect that the inclusion of technology flow variables
(EXTERN1 and EXTERN2) would weaken the equipment supplier variable. This is
apparently not the case in the simple specifications without endogeneity correction in
Table 1. Since the flow variables are based on patent statistics, it is conceivable that the
survey variable EQSUP
Y and the flow measure capture largely independent aspects of
technology flows and contributions to technical change.
                                               
20  See Griliches's on the relatively large intra-industry variance in his comment to Levin et
al. (1987).18
Table 1: R&D Intensity Regressions (Dependent Variable: RS)
OLS-H OLS-H OLS-H OLS-H OLS-H





























































































































N 120 120 120 120 120
S.E.E. 1.353 1.339 1.327 1.300 1.281
Note: Standard errors are in brackets below coefficients. The Coefficients for the GROWTH and APPR variables
are not included. Both coefficients were positive but insignificant in all specifications.
* significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
** significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
*** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test)19
The contributions by USERS
Y appear to complement R&D efforts within an industry.
The coefficients for this variable are extremely stable and in all specifications significant
at the one percent level (two-tailed tests). But this variable may also capture the effect of
product differentiation. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have pointed out, industries that
produce custom-tailored goods are likely to do more R&D in order to produce for
relatively specific requirements. External contributions from government laboratories and
agencies and from universities are also clearly identified by the regressions. Finally, the
percentage of new plant, property, and equipment (NEWPL10) is positively correlated
with the industry's R&D efforts. These two coefficient signs are expected and also
consistent with the Cohen and Levinthal results.
The hypothesis to be tested here concerns the effect of the supply sector and technology
flow variables. As predicted, the coefficients of the supply sector and flow variables
themselves carry negative signs, while the interaction terms between these variables and
the industry's own concentration are always positive.21 In the simple OLS estimations
(e.g. in (R5)) there appears to be no tradeoff between the effects of these two variables.
Including both in regression (R5) actually strengthens both estimates. Note also that the
concentration variable itself does not appear to play any significant role in these OLS
regressions. Nonetheless, the results suggest that industries with high and with low
concentration appear to react quite differently to the presence of strong supply sectors.
In the case of fragmented sectors, the presence of oligopolistic supply sectors is clearly
correlated with a reduced R&D intensity.
Similarly, greater inflows of R&D as measured by Scherer's indicator appear to have a
negative effect on the R&D intensity of fragmented downstream sectors while the result
is reversed for highly concentrated ones. It is noteworthy that in the simple specifications
in Table 1, there is apparently no tradeoff between the variable measuring supply sector
structure (SH45) and the measure of interindustry technology flows (EXTERN1).
                                               
21  Including one of the supply sector variables (WSH10 or SH45) and one of the technology
flow variables (EXTERN1 or EXTERN2) without the respective interaction terms
produces only small and insignificant coefficients. These results are not shown in Table
1 and Table 2.20
Table 2: R&D Intensity Regressions (Dependent Variable: RS)
OLSH NL2SLS OLSH NL2SLS

























































































































N 120 120 120 120
S.E.E. 1.281 1.650 1.322 1.687
c²=10.84 c²=13.08
Notes:  Standard errors are in brackets below coefficients. The Coefficients for the GROWTH and APPR variables
are not included. Both coefficients were positive but insignificant in all specifications. The c² statistic for
the overidentification test is the sample size multiplied by the R² obtained from regressing the residuals on
the instruments (Hausman 1983).
*  significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test)
**  significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
*** significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test)21
Comparing the results of specification (R3) in Table 1 to those of (R7) in Table 2, it
turns out that including the second technology flow variable (EXTERN2) and the
respective interaction term (EXTERN2*C4) weakens the supply sector variable only
slightly. Based on these results, one would conclude that the coefficients for the flow
variables and the coefficient for the indicator of supply sector structure reflect largely
independent phenomena.
These results provide consistent support for the suggestion that vertical organization
exerts a strong effect on R&D incentives. One could be concerned, however, that the use
of the concentration variable causes a bias, since it may be determined endogenously.
Similarly, the inflow of technology (measured by EXTERN1 and EXTERN2) is
conceivably determined simultaneously with R&D intensity in the downstream industry.
Indeed, the theoretical model developed by Harhoff (1996) predicts a simultaneous
determination of upstream and downstream R&D incentives.
The specifications presented in Table 2 address these concerns regarding a possible
simultaneity bias. Regressions (R6) and (R8) are based on a nonlinear 2SLS
specification. R&D intensity is assumed to be endogenously determined with market
structure and technology inflows. The instruments used include all exogenous and
predetermined variables, i.e., all independent variables with the exception of the four-firm
concentration ratio and the technology flow measures. Furthermore, I followed Farber
(1981) and used as instruments measures of minimum efficient scale, capital
requirements, and the predetermined value of the concentration ratio in 1972. To identify
the technology flows, I also included six industry classification variables (DCHEM,
DELEC, DMACH, DINST, DMETAL, DFOOD) as instruments. Identification of the
nonlinear model was also facilitated by using nonlinear combinations of the instruments
(Hausman 1983). The need to estimate a nonlinear relationship arises, because the
endogenously determined variables enter the equation both linearly and in interaction
terms.
The results in (R6) can be directly compared to the OLS results in (R5). As one expects,
the reduced efficiency of the instrumental variable estimator causes standard errors to be
somewhat larger throughout. The interaction terms maintain a positive sign, while the
SH45 and EXTERN1 variables again have a negative sign. Apparently, the instrumental
variables estimation has the strongest effect on the technology flow coefficients. The
coefficients for EXTERN1 and the interaction term in specification (R6) are substantially
larger than in the simple least squares model. The overidentification test does not lead to
a rejection of this specification since I cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions at the
ten percent level. Estimating R&D intensity, industry structure, and technology flows
under the private goods assumption (EXTERN1) endogenously supports the conclusions
derived from the OLS results.22
The endogeneity correction has an interesting effect on the coefficients of some of the
control variables. The coefficient of EQSUP
Y (measuring the contributions to
downstream innovation made by equipment suppliers) is barely significant in specification
(R6) and (R8) and considerably smaller than in the simple least squares estimations. The
four-firm concentration ratio becomes significant at the five percent level and is negative
in both 2SLS-specifications. Finally, the imitation lag variable is significant at the five
percent level in (R6) and (R8) and considerably larger than in the OLS specifications.
However, none of these differences between 2SLS and OLS estimates is large enough to
reverse any of the conclusions discussed above.
If the flow measures computed under the public goods assumption are used, another
interesting result emerges from the 2SLS estimation in (R8). The supply sector variables
which are significant in the OLS specification (R7) become insignificant and smaller in
size, while the flow variable and its interaction term with industry structure remain
significant and are larger than in specification (R7). This result on its own would suggest
that the technology flow variable EXTERN2 has a stronger explanatory effect than the
measures of supply sector structure. Indeed, regressing EXTERN2 on the structural
variable SH45, the interaction term SH45*C4, and industry concentration demonstrates a
strong relationship, with SH45 being positive and significant at the five percent level.
The interaction term is negative and significant at the ten percent level. This result is
puzzling because the EXTERN1 variable shows no apparent tradeoff with the measures
of supply sector structure. The observation that the flow measure EXTERN2 reduces the
supply sector indicators to insignificance could be explained if the weighting scheme used
by Scherer (1984, pp. 432) to derive this variable is correlated with the factor share
structure for any given buyer industry. However, one would expect this correlation to
show up in specification (R7) as well. A less systematic explanation may come from the
observation that the flow measures based on the public goods assumption were only
weak predictors of productivity growth (Scherer 1984, p. 449). Since calculating the
flow measures under the public goods assumption required a complex set of
assumptions, the quality of the EXTERN1 variable may simply be superior to that of the
public goods measure EXTERN2.
With the exception of these conflicting findings in equations (R6) and (R8), the results
support the first two hypotheses derived above. But given the cross-sectional nature of
the sample it is not possible to test whether it is strategic behavior by upstream suppliers
or some form of hold-up problem that leads to the pattern revealed by these regression
estimates.23
5 Discussion  and Conclusions
Despite its importance, the impact of vertical organization on innovation incentives
appears to be poorly understood at this point. This paper provides just a first exploratory
study, but two simple stylized facts emerge from the empirical analysis and are consistent
with a number of theories. First, once a fragmented buyer industry is dependent on a
relatively concentrated supply sector, vertical organization appears to matter
considerably. Second, technology flows as captured in Scherer's (1984) data appear to
act as substitutes for an industry's own R&D if the industry's concentration is relatively
low. Both results are broadly consistent with a number of case studies and with the
theoretical arguments described above.
The empirical results are consistent with von Hippel's (1982) suggestion that
appropriability and structural conditions in vertically related industries may exert a strong
influence on innovation incentives. Von Hippel's hypothesis links these conditions to the
likelihood that the upstream or downstream sector becomes the source of innovation.
This paper has provided some evidence that the patterns of R&D spending may be
affected as well. Both statements are ultimately consistent in that one expects (relatively)
greater R&D expenditures to precede a consistently higher likelihood of achieving major
innovations.
A number of hypotheses need to be given greater attention in future work, in particular
the impact of the appropriability regime on shifts in the locus of R&D (and presumably
of innovation). Theoretical models (von Hippel 1982, Harhoff 1996) suggest that weak
appropriability in any industry would strengthen innovation incentives in vertically related
industries, as long as these can profit sufficiently. Thus, suppliers may be willing to
provide their customers with technical information for innovation to compensate for the
customers' lower innovation incentives. An analysis of this type was not undertaken here,
since the Yale data are not particularly reliable regarding the nature of an industry's
appropriability regime. Recently generated data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(described in Harhoff and Licht 1994) may be better suited for this task, and will be used
in future work.
Clearly, the results described here need to be interpreted with some caution, since they
come from reduced-form models and cross-sectional data. Further corroboration, based
on firm level data and more structured models, is highly desirable. Supplier-buyer
relationships have been subject to a great deal of change over the last decade (e.g. in the
automotive and semiconductor industries). More research on this issue could provide us
with important clues as to the nature and implications of those changes. In addition, it
would promote our understanding of innovation activities that are distributed across a
number of vertically related players.24
Appendix
Table A.1 Variable Definitions (Data sources are given in parentheses)
RS R&D Intensity (defined as company-financed R&D expenditures in 1976
divided by total line of business sales and transfers (FTC))
APPR Appropriability measure (Yale Survey, maximum score of responses to
questions IA1 ... IA6 and IB1 ... IB6)
IMLAG Imitation lag time for a major patented product innovation (Yale Survey,
question IIF1)
INCELAS Income Elasticity (Levin 1981).
PELAS Price elasticity of demand (Levin 1981)
GROWTH Time shift parameter (Levin 1981)
EQSUP Contribution to technical change by suppliers of research and production
equipment (Yale Survey, average score of responses to question IIIE3 and
IIIE4)
USERS Contribution to technical change by users of industry output (Yale Survey,
question IIIE5)
GOVUNIV Contribution to technical change by government agencies/laboratories and
university research (Yale Survey, average score of responses to questions
IIIE6, IIIE7 and IIIE8)
SCIENCE1 Relevance of scientific and engineering disciplines to technical change (Yale
survey, average score of responses to question IIIAI, items a, b, d, e and
question IIIA2, items c-e)
SCIENCE2 Relevance of of scientific and engineering disciplines to technical change
(Yale survey, average score of responses to question IIIAI, item c and
question IIIA2, items a, b, and f)
NEWPL10 Percentage of property, plant, and equipment installed within five years
preceding 1976 (FTC) (divided by a factor of 10)
C4 Four-firm concentration ratio (COM 1977)
WSH10 Aggregate weighted factor cost share, sum of factor cost shares of
intermediate inputs weighted by the respective supply sector's four-firm
concentration ratio (IO 1977, COM 1977) (divided by a factor of 10)
SH45 Factor cost share of intermediate inputs supplied by supply sectors with
C4￿45(IO 1977, COM 1977)
EXTERN1 Value of R&D (private goods assumption) flowing in from other sectors
divided by sales of the receiving industry (Scherer 1984)
EXTERN2 Value of R&D (public goods assumption) flowing in from other sector
divided by sales of the receiving industry (Scherer 1984)25
DCHEM Dummy variable for chemical industries
DELEC Dummy variable for electrotechnical and electronics industries
DMACH Dummy variable for machinery producing industries
DINST Dummy variable for instruments producing industries
DMETAL Dummy variable for primary and secondary metals industries
DFOOD Dummy variable for food industries
Data Sources
FTC Federal Trade Commission. Annual Line of Business Report.
COM 1972 US Bureau of the Census. 1972 Census of Manufactures.
COM 1977 US Bureau of the Census. 1977 Census of Manufactures.
IO 1977 Input-Output-Tables of the US Economy (1977)
Yale Survey Levin et al. (1987)
All technology flow variables originate from Scherer's (1983) dataset.
Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RS 1.7765 1.7366 0.0895 8.5105
PELAS 1.8248 1.6969 1.0000 9.2100
INCELAS 0.9003 0.5387 0.0000 2.0000
GROWTH 0.9395 0.9810 –1.7899 2.9971
APPR 6.0143 0.5674 4.0000 7.0000
IMLAG 3.7945 0.9335 1.0000 6.0000
SCIENCE1 3.9950 0.5638 2.2857 5.2857
SCIENCE2 3.0946 0.7251 1.5000 6.0000
GOVUNIV 2.7483 0.9197 1.0000 5.7500
EQSUP 4.2726 0.8394 2.0000 6.0000
USERS 4.0279 1.0280 1.0000 7.0000
NEWPL10 3.8700 0.9347 1.5000 6.5000
SH45 0.1799 0.1390 0.0036 0.6419
WSH10 2.3581 0.6973 0.6288 4.5392
C4 42.5580 19.6620 7.0000 93.0000
EXTERN1 0.6762 0.7857 0.0132 6.9572
EXTERN2 3.7845 2.9387 0.4155 18.2230
Note: 120 observations for each variable. See the text for an explanation of these variables.26
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